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INTRODUCTION 
The resumption of India-Pakistan peace dialogue after a hiatus of nearly eighteen 
months resulting from the  Mumbai terrorist attacks, has revived interest in different 
formulas, proposals and options that have been made from time to time to resolve the 
Kashmir dispute, the root-cause of “unending conflict” between the two nuclear-armed 
neighbours. This paper attempts to make a contribution towards this ongoing exploration 
of feasible ideas by highlighting the relevance of the Difference Principle expounded by 
John Rawls in his Theory of Justice as a key component of a lasting India-Pakistan peace 
deal on Kashmir. The paper begins with a brief account of the historical background of 
the Kashmir dispute, its evolution and a summary of the competing Indian and Pakistani 
claims to the disputed territory. Section two of the paper provides a descriptive account 
of the various solutions that have been proposed and the attempts made by India and 
Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The last section of the paper offers a summary of 
the main tenets of Rawls’s theory of Justice and examines the relevance of the Difference 
Principle as a guide to finding a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute. 
 
SECTION I 
 
A.  Historical Background 
The state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a landlocked territory, lies in 
northwestern part of Indian subcontinent. It became a disputed territory after the partition 
of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Bounded on northeast by the Uygur Autonomous 
Region of Sinkiang and Tibet (both parts of the Peoples Republic of China), it is 
surrounded by the Indian states of Himachel Pradesh and Punjab on the South; on the 
northwest by Afghanistan and on the west by Pakistan.  
The territory’s total area is 85,806 square miles (222,236 square km), of which 31, 
643 square miles (81, 954 square km) is controlled by India. The modern state of J&K 
evolved from the Dogra heartland in Jammu, as the home of many different ethnic groups 
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and a diverse set of cultures.1 In 1834, Ladakh was conquered and incorporated into the 
state. Baltistan was conquered and annexed by the Dogras in 1840. The Valley of 
Kashmir joined in 1846, when the British sold it to the Sikh ruler Gulab Singh for 7.5 
million rupees.  In 1935, Gilgit was leased to the British for 60 years. The British 
terminated the lease in 1947. Aksai China came under the Chinese control in 1962 
following the Sino-Indian War that year. Poonch joined the state in 1936, as the result of 
a judicial settlement.2 
The Kashmir Valley’s inhabitants were predominantly Muslims, with a small 
community of Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits; Jammu had a Dogra Hindu majority with a 
significant Muslim component; the western strip from Muzaffarabad to Mirpur had a 
majority of Punjabi Muslims; Gilgit, Skardu, and Kargil were also inhabited by Muslims; 
and a majority of Ladakh’s residents were Lamaistic Buddhists.3 
At the time of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir was one of the 564 princely states that faced the choice of 
either joining India or Pakistan in accordance with the twin principles of 
geographical contiguity and self-determination following the lapse of British 
paramountcy. Although J&K had a Muslim majority (77 percent in the census of 
1941), and shared a long border with the new state of Pakistan, the Maharaja 
refused to opt for Pakistan.  
His reticence stemmed both from his desire to remain independent and from 
agitation by his predominantly Muslim subjects against his brutal rule. Faced with 
the armed revolt by Muslims from Poonch in June 1947, the Maharaja retaliated with 
brutal force against them. The revolt then spread to the other areas of Jammu and 
Kashmir. To stabilise the situation, the Maharaja signed a standstill agreement with 
the new state of Pakistan. The situation deteriorated during August and September of 
1947, as the Kashmiri Muslims openly revolted. Their fellow tribesmen from 
Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province joined in this armed insurrection, By late 
October, 1947, the tribesmen-led rebellion succeeded in capturing several towns, 
massacred large number of civilians, and advanced within four miles of the capital, 
Srinagar.  
To forestall his imminent overthrow by the advancing rebel troops, the Maharaja 
requested military aid from India, and approved the annexation of Kashmir to the Indian 
Union on October 26, 1947. The Indian Government accepted Maharaja’s accession, 
while stipulating that it should ultimately be ratified by popular consultation. India’s 
military intervention on behalf of the besieged Maharaja led to the first India-Pakistan 
war over Kashmir. India aired the dispute before the United Nations, calling for 
international intervention in the matter.  
After their first war over Kashmir in 1947-48, India and Pakistan signed a cease-
fire agreement on January 1, 1949. India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir again in 
1965, and the resulting line of control divided old Jammu and Kashmir into four political 
units:  
 
1Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the 
Kashmiri People. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 17. 
2Ibid.  
3Ibid. 
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(1) Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir Valley (Indian-occupied Kashmir; (2) Azad 
Kashmir (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir); (3) the Northern Area, administered by Pakistan; 
and (4) Aksai Chin, controlled by China.4 
 
B.  Indian and Pakistani Perspectives on Kashmir 
The Indian Approach: At the core of Indian position on Kashmir is New 
Delhi’s claim that the decision of the Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to the Indian 
Union, regardless of its circumstances, is  “final and legal and it cannot be disputed.” 
If there is any “unfinished” business of partition it is the requirement that Pakistan 
relinquish control of that part of Jammu and Kashmir that it illegally occupies. India 
further maintains that the UN Resolutions calling for the will of the people to be 
ascertained are no longer tenable because Pakistan has not fulfilled the precondition 
of withdrawal from the territory it occupied through aggression. New Delhi further 
maintains that after Pakistan’s attempts to alter the status quo by force of war in 
1965, Islamabad has forfeited the right to invoke the UN Resolutions. The will of the 
people does not need to be ascertained only through a plebiscite. The problem of 
Kashmir, according to India, is one of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. The targets 
are Muslims in Kashmir, belying Pakistan’s argument that it is concerned about the 
welfare of Muslims in Kashmir. While India wants to resolve all outstanding issues 
with Pakistan through a process of dialogue, the integrity and sovereignty of India 
cannot be a matter for discussion. 
The Indian policy towards Kashmir operates at three distinct levels: local, bilateral 
and international. At the local level, the principal Indian goal is to crush the Kashmiri 
resistance by massive use of force on the one hand and by manipulating the differences 
among different Kashmiri resistance groups on the other. 
At the bilateral Indo-Pakistan level, India, while expressing its willingness to 
discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, has tended to avoid conducting any 
meaningful dialogue with Pakistan regarding Kashmir that involves a movement away 
from the stated Indian position that Kashmir is an integral part of India. Although India’s 
principal purpose in maintaining a posture of dialogue with Pakistan is to gain time to 
consolidate its hold over in Kashmir by pacifying the Kashmiri resistance, independent 
analysts believe that “already in possession of the larger and most prized section of the 
state and aware of the difficulty that would face any effort to pry Pakistan loose from the 
rest,” New Delhi would be willing to “accept conversion of the LoC…into a permanent 
international boundary.”5   
At the international level, Indian policy on Kashmir is primarily aimed at three 
objectives: deflecting the Pakistani campaign alleging human-rights violations in 
Kashmir; emphasising that the Simla agreement provides the only viable forum to settle 
the Kashmir issue; and discrediting the Kashmiri resistance movement as a “terrorist 
activity” sponsored by Pakistan. 
 
4Ibid. 
5Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: on Regional Conflict and Its Resolution. 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p.219-20. 
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The Pakistani Approach 
Historically, the Government of Pakistan has maintained that J&K has been a 
disputed territory. The state’s accession to India in October 1947 was provisional and 
executed under the coercive pressure of Indian military presence. The disputed status of J 
& K is acknowledged in the UN Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 and 
January 5, 1949, to which both Pakistan and India agreed.  These resolutions remain fully 
in force today, and cannot be unilaterally disregarded by either party.6 
(1) Talks between India and Pakistan over the future status of J & K should aim 
to secure the right of self-determination for the Kashmiri people.  This right 
entails a free, fair, and internationally supervised plebiscite, as agreed in the 
1948-1949 UN Security Council resolutions. 
(2) The plebiscite should offer the people of Kashmir the choice of permanent 
accession to either Pakistan or India. 
(3) Talks between India and Pakistan in regard to the future status of J&K 
should be held in conformity both with the Simla Agreement of July 1972 
and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. An international 
mediatory role in these talks may be appropriate. 
 
SECTION II 
 
A.  Proposed Solutions to the Kashmir Dispute 
During the last five and a half decades, a number of solutions have been proposed 
by analyst to resolve the Kashmir dispute. These possible solutions can be roughly 
categorised into four major groups, each group expanding on a particular method.7  These 
groups are as follows: 
 
1.  Plebiscite 
(a) Hold a plebiscite for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir under the 
auspices of the United Nations.  The plebiscite should conform to the 
original commitment between Lord Mountbatten and the Maharaja, which 
was repeatedly supported by Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 
in the wake of Partition. 
(b) Hold a U.N. supervised partial plebiscite in only the Kashmir Vale, and 
agree to partition the remainder of the state. 
(c) Hold a (limited or comprehensive) plebiscite on some future date under the 
supervision of neutral and impartial international observers. 
(d) Hold a (limited or comprehensive) plebiscite under the joint supervision of 
India and Pakistan. 
 
6In defence of the continued validity of the UN resolutions on Kashmir see Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir 
Dispute: An International Law Perspective. (Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 2000), Ch.V.  
7This categorisation has been suggested by Prevaiz Iqbal Cheema. See Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Solution 
for Kashmir Dispute?” Regional Studies (Autumn 1986), pp. 3-15. 
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2.  Partition 
(a) Partition the state on the basis of communal composition, apportioning the 
Muslim majority areas to Pakistan and non-Muslim territory of J&K 
especially Jammu and Ladakh to India. 
(b) Partition the state along the UN cease-fire line. 
(c) Partition the state along the Line of Control (LoC) with minor adjustments 
with a view to straighten the border. 
(d) Integrate Azad Kashmir and Baltistan with Pakistan; Jammu and Ladakh 
with India; and hold a plebiscite in the Kashmir Vale. The UN will govern 
the plebiscite and its subsequent implementation. Partition the state in 
congruence with an agreed upon formula, keeping the strategic needs of both 
Pakistan and India in mind. 
(e) Integrate Azad Kashmir and Baltistan into Pakistan; Jammu and Ladakh into 
India; and accord independent status to the Kashmir valley, to be guaranteed 
by India, Pakistan, and the great powers. 
 
3. Independence 
(a) Award independent status to the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, to be 
respected and guaranteed by both regional and global powers. 
(b) Make the Kashmir Vale an independent state, and integrate the rest of the 
territories with India (Ladakh and Jammu) and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and 
Baltistan). International guarantees are necessary for this solution. 
(c) Make both Azad Kashmir and occupied Kashmir UN trust territories.  Grant 
independence after a decade of UN-supervised rule. 
(d) Make only the Kashmir Valley a UN trust territory, and allow Pakistan to 
integrate Azad Kashmir and Baltistan, giving India defacto control over 
Jammu and Ladakh. 
 
4.  Condominium/Confederation 
(a) Establish a condominium of both Pakistan and India over the whole of 
Kashmir, with maximum autonomy for the state. This solution implies joint 
management of the state’s external and defense affairs by India and Pakistan. 
(b) Grant only the Kashmir Valley condominium status, and partition the rest of 
the state between India and Pakistan. 
(c) Establish a condominium of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation) for either the entire J & K or the Kashmir Valley alone. 
(d) Form a confederation of Pakistan, India and Kashmir, with maximum 
autonomy to each of the constituent unit. 
 
B.  Summary of the Major Proposals Advanced since 1947 
What follows is a chronological account of the various proposals put forth to 
resolve the Kashmir dispute. This account is divided into five phases, each covering ten 
years.  Table One contains a summary of these proposals, categorised by the solution’s 
nature,  source,  basic principles, status,  responses by India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri 
people and their pros and cons.  
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C.  Chronological Account of Proposed Solutions 
 
The First Phase: 1947-57 
United Nations Resolution and Owen Dixon’s Proposal 
The UN Security Council Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, 
proposed the plebiscite option for settling the Kashmir dispute. These resolutions laid 
down the principles and procedures for a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. 
Both India and Pakistan accepted these resolutions but later clashed over the 
interpretation of various clauses especially those pertaining to the demilitarisation of 
J&K. In 1950, the Security Council nominated Sir Owen Dixon, as the UN mediator.  He 
attempted to address the Azad Kashmir territory by suggesting that administrative 
responsibilities be assigned to the local authorities.  These district magistrates would be 
supervised by United Nations officers. India rejected this proposal. 
Sir Dixon then suggested establishing a single government for the whole State of 
Jammu Kashmir during the period of the plebiscite.  This coalition government could be 
composed of the two hitherto hostile parties; a neutral administration by trusted persons 
outside politics; or an executive constituted of United Nations representatives. Even this 
alternative was rejected by India and Pakistan. 
Stymied by Indian and Pakistani opposition, Sir Owen proposed two alternative 
plans. The first entails taking a region-by-region plebiscite, allocating each area to either 
Pakistan or India, according to the vote.  One variation on this suggestion was to allot to 
Pakistan and India those areas for which a regional vote would have a foregone 
conclusion, limiting the plebiscite to the Valley of Kashmir.  
Pakistan objected to this proposal on the ground that India had previously 
committed to hold a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. India 
indicated a willingness to consider a plebiscite, but only one limited to the Kashmir 
Valley and some adjacent areas. However, Indian suggestions as to the allocation of other 
territories among Pakistan and India were unworkably biased.  Sir Owen recalled that 
Indian proposals “appeared to me to go much beyond what according to my conception 
of the situation was reasonable.” Pakistan refused to budge from its position, though it 
was amenable to straight partition if it was given the valley. This, however, was 
unacceptable to India. 
As a last resort, Sir Owen Dixon presented both governments with another 
proposal which called for a partition of the country and a plebiscite for the Valley.  The 
plebiscite, which would be conducted by an administrative body of United Nations 
officers, would require complete demilitarisation. Pakistan rejected this proposal.8 
 
The Second Phase: 1958-68 
India—Pakistan Statement of Objectives (1963) 
During the second round of Ministerial-level talks held in New Delhi, from 
January 16-19, 1963, Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulifkar Ali Bhutto and his Indian 
counterpart, Swaran Singh, signed a joint statement of objectives. According to this 
 
8For details, see Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1966).Chapter Seven. 
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“secret” joint statement, both sides had agreed to the following points as a basis for 
potential solution to the Kashmir problem: 
1. “To explore political settlement of the Kashmir dispute without prejudice to 
basic positions of parties. 
2. Agree to examine proposals for honourable, equitable and final boundary 
settlement taking into account: 
A. India and Pakistan seek delineation of international boundary in Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
B. Pakistan delegation urged territorial divisions taking into account 
composition of population, control of rivers, requirements of defense, and 
other considerations relevant to the delineation of international 
boundaries and acceptable to people of state. 
C. Indian delegation urged that any territorial readjustments necessary on 
national basis take into account geography, administration, and other 
considerations and involves least disturbance to life and welfare of people. 
3. Disengagement of Indian and Pakistani forces in and around Kashmir is 
essential part of settlement. 
4. Settlement should also embody determination of two peoples live side by side 
in peace and friendship and to solve all other problems peacefully and to 
mutual benefit. 
5. Ways and means of removing other major irritants and developing practical 
cooperation between two countries should be considered…”.9 
D. Delineating an equitable international boundary in Jammu and Kashmir. 
 Because of the failure of Bhutto-Swaran Singh, this joint statement ultimately 
proved merely aspirational.  
 
The Tashkent Declaration 
Following the 1965 India-Pakistan war, President General Ayub Khan and Prime 
Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri were invited to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, by the Soviet 
government. After protracted negotiations brokered by Moscow, both sides agreed to 
issue a declaration in January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration did not propose any 
concrete solution to the Kashmir problem, but merely stated that the “interest of peace in 
the region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and indeed the interests of 
the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by continuance of tensions between the 
two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and 
each of the sides set forth its respective position.” 
 
Sumit Ganguly Proposal 
Sumit Ganguly, a leading Indian-American scholar, has argued that “any option 
that fails to recognise the fundamental territorial integrity of India will not meet the test 
 
9Louis Smith and Glenn W. LaFantasie (eds.) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963. Vol 
XIX South Asia. (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 478. 
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of political feasibility. No government in India will concede Kashmir, even if it entails 
continuing losses in blood and treasure…10“ This structural constraint, he points out 
should not discourage New Delhi from initiating a dialogue process with Islamabad. Such 
a dialogue has become imperative for both sides as “war could break out, through a 
combination of misperception and inadvertence.” In the proposed negotiations, India 
should offer Pakistan a “package of concessions”, “in three areas of contention: Sir 
Creek, the Wullar Barrage, and the Siachin Glacier,” along with “limited territorial 
concessions along the LoC in Kashmir.” In return for these concessions, New Delhi 
would expect Pakistan to end its “active support for the insurgency,” and this would 
enable the Indian government to start negotiations with the insurgents for a political deal 
in which “independence” and “merger with Pakistan” will remain non-negotiable.11 
 
Selig Harrison’s Proposal: The Trieste Model 
Selig Harrison, a noted American scholar, has suggested that Kashmir under 
Indian control should be partitioned. Jammu and Ladakh should become part of the 
Indian union, while the Kashmir valley would be “united with sizable Muslim pockets in 
Jammu and Ladakh.” India may give to this “new state,” according to Harrison, “far-
reaching autonomy as part of a Trieste-type solution,” and in return, Pakistan would 
“grant the same degree of autonomy to Azad Kashmir. These new entities will be 
autonomous in all areas except defence, foreign affairs, communication, currency, foreign 
aid and trade.  
Both India and Pakistan would withdraw their armed forces under UN 
supervision, retaining the right to reintroduce them under specified circumstances. 
Pakistan would terminate its support of Kashmiri insurgents. The present LoC will 
become an international border. As in the Trieste settlement, it would be a porous 
border, with Kashmiris free to travel back and forth without Indian and Pakistani visas.  
Gilgit, Hunza and Baltistan would remain part of Pakistan, thus retaining Pakistan’s 
access to China. 
As the first step, India would have to split the state, integrating most of Jammu and 
Ladakh with the Indian Union, while giving special autonomous status to a new state 
uniting the Kashmir Valley and the sizable Muslim pockets in Jammu and Ladakh. India 
could then offer to give this new state far-reaching autonomy as part of a Trieste-type 
solution, under which Pakistan would grant the same degree of autonomy to Azad 
Kashmir. 
Both New Delhi and Islamabad would surrender authority to these new entities, 
except in the area of defense, foreign affairs, communications, and currency. The new 
regions would gain the right to conduct independent foreign aid and foreign trade 
dealings. 
This settlement, if accompanied by large-scale economic inputs, would be 
acceptable to many Liberation Front leaders and a growing number of war-weary 
Kashmiris. However, India shows no signs of moving in this direction, as its current 
policy aims to militarily crush the insurgency before pursuing a political solution. 
 
10 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. (Harvard: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 145. 
11Ibid, p. 148. 
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New Delhi fears that giving Kashmir special autonomous status would set a 
precedent for demands by other potentially secessionist states. The controversy over what 
to do in Kashmir is part of the developing debate over whether the entire Indian federal 
system should be more decentralised. This debate is directly linked to the sensitive 
problem of Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Nominally, India is a secular state, but the 
secular principle is under attack from the Hindu right. Advocates of secularism fear that 
an autonomous, Muslim-majority Kashmir would end up seeking independence or 
accession to Pakistan, thus exposing the 90 million Muslims in other parts of India to 
continuing attack as potential traitors.12 
 
The Third Phase: 1969-79 
Simla Agreement 
Following the third India-Pakistan war in 1971, both countries signed the Simla 
Accord in July 1972. Clause (ii) of the Article VI of the Simla Agreement stated that “In 
Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease fire of December 17, 
1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of 
either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual 
differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the 
threat of the use of force in violation of this line.” Article VI of the Simla Agreement 
further committed both sides to “discuss further modalities and arrangements for the 
establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including…a final 
settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and resumption of diplomatic relations.  
 
The Fourth Phase: 1980-90 
Robert Wirsing’s Proposal for Constructive External Engagement 
Robert Wirsing, a leading American security expert has suggested that the 1948-49 
United Nations resolutions possess little relevance in the wake of the upheavals, 
insurgency, spread of nationalism and Islamic militancy in Kashmir.  
The objective conditions that gave legitimacy to the original notions of plebiscite 
and self-determination have changed, yet neither India nor Pakistan recognises this.  
Instead, both remain glued to their traditional positions. Meanwhile, since the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, the Cold War rivalry of super powers has diminished.  
These changes now provide an excellent opportunity for international mediation. 
Given changes in both the internal situation of Kashmir and the external environment, 
Wirsing suggests that now ‘international pressure’ can be applied ‘more deliberately, 
consistently and evenhandedly’, to resolve the Kashmir issue.  
Wirsing links the international mediators’ ‘evenhandedness’ with ‘regional 
reconciliation’.  Unless all parties in the dispute—Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri—are 
willing to show signs of compromise and the spirit of give-and-take, no resolution of the 
problem is likely. He argues that the Kashmir conflict has had a powerful impact on the 
relationships of both India and Pakistan with the United States. Most conspicuous over 
the years, perhaps, has been its impact on Washington’s decisions in regard to arms 
transfers to the region.  From 1947 onward, these transfers could not be made without 
 
12 Selig S. Harrison, “South Asia and United States: A Chance for a Fresh Start”, Current History. Vol. 
91, No. 563 (March 1992), p. 102. 
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factoring in their probable consequences for the region’s most bitter territorial rivalry. 
The conflict has had equally broad impact, however, on a whole range of long-term U.S. 
policy efforts in the region, including nuclear non-proliferation.  A series of crises have 
threatened, moreover, to escalate into a full-scale war that could, in turn, force the 
unwilling involvement of the United States. Like its Indian and Pakistani clients, the 
United States was thus in some respects held hostage to the Kashmir problem. This 
problem could be neglected, perhaps, but not avoided.13 
 
The Fifth Phase: 1991-2001 
Bhartiya Janata Party’s proposal for Kashmir Annexation 
Radical demographic change has been proposed by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) 
in India and many other Hindu nationalist organisations as a solution to the Kashmir 
problem. Specifically, the BJP has called for the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian 
Constitution.  Article 370 gives special status to Kashmir among the Indian states; non-
Kashmiris may neither seek residence nor purchase property in Kashmir. By abrogating 
such restrictions and opening Kashmir to Hindu and Sikh settlement, India could 
transform Kashmir into a Hindu-Sikh majority state. The 1998 BJP manifesto not only 
clearly stated that India’s “sovereignty over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir” was 
unequivocal, but also committed the BJP to seize control of all areas that were “under 
foreign occupations”.14  
   
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front’s Proposal for an Independent Kashmir  
According to the JKLF,15 a Pakistan-based Kashmiri Organisation, a single 
solution of the Kashmir issue is at once the most peaceful, practicable, equitable, 
legitimate, democratic and permanent. The JKLF proposes to re-unite the divided 
Jammu-Kashmir State and make it an independent country, with a democratic, federal 
and non-communal system of government.  The country would maintain a neutral foreign 
policy modeled after Switzerland’s, aiming toward maintaining friendly relations with 
both India and Pakistan. After 15 years, there would be a referendum under UN (or IKC) 
auspices.  This referendum could determine whether the State will retain its independence 
forever, or if it instead becomes part of India or Pakistan.  A popular verdict will be 
accepted by all concerned quarters as a legitimate final settlement, and will therefore be 
most faithfully implemented. 
An eleven member committee called International Kashmir Committee (IKC) 
includes one member each from the 5 permanent members of the UNSC; one nominated 
by UN Secretary General; two members nominated by the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM); one by Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC); and one member each from 
Germany and Japan.  The IKC will be responsible for implementing the solution formula 
in co-operation with the governments of India and Pakistan; each of the State’s three 
parts; and all of the Kashmiri political parties. The formula’s implementation will be 
carried out in five phases. 
 
13Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute. (New York: St. Martin’s press, 1994), 
p. 237. 
14Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and 
Kashmiri People. (London Lynne Rienner publishers, 1996), p. 164. 
15Dr Haider Hijazi, JKLF Formula to Solve Kashmir Issue. (Rawalpindi, 1992). 
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The first phase: will finalise the plan’s details, discussing it through individual 
contacts and collective sittings with the governments of India, Pakistan, Kashmir’s three 
parts, and all political parties and militant groups. The agreement will then be signed by 
all these stakeholders and registered with the United Nations. An agreement about the 
security and the safety of the frontiers of the State will also be signed and registered with 
the UN. 
The second phase: will entail simultaneous withdrawal from the State by all civil 
personnel and armed forces of both India and Pakistan, as well as all non-Kashmiri 
militants. 
The third phase: includes the disarming of Kashmiri militants, and repatriation of 
those Kashmiris who fled their homes and migrated elsewhere. Those who left between 
1947 and 1989-90 will have to choose whether to return to Kashmir permanently or 
remain in the country where they have been since their migration from Kashmir. 
The fourth phase: will begin the State’s re-unification.  This phase entails 
opening intra-state borders closed since 1949; forming an interim National Government 
and those for each of Kashmir’s 5 provinces (Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Azad 
Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan); appointing a Constitutional Committee, framing an 
interim constitution, electing the National Assembly (House of Representatives) and 
the Upper House (House of Notables), as well as the provincial assemblies/councils 
under the interim government. General elections should be held after every 5 years or 
when decided by the government. 
The fifth and the final phase will be the referendum to determine whether Kashmir 
should retain its independence or become part of India or Pakistan.  It will be held 15 
years after re-unification, under the auspices of the UN or IKC.  Its resulting legitimacy 
will ensure that the popular verdict will be accepted as the final settlement and faithfully 
implemented. 
 
The Kashmir American Council Proposal for a U.S. Brokered Tripartite Dialogue 
The Kashmir-American Council, a Washington-based organisation comprising 
largely of Kashmiri-Americans with pro-Pakistan leanings, has proposed an active U.S. 
mediation role in Kashmir. It suggests a dialogue among four parties: the U.S., Pakistan, 
India, and the ‘Kashmiri People’.  
As a first step, the area must be demilitarised.  Indian and Pakistani troops must 
revert to their respective positions ‘on the borders outside Kashmir’.  A small police force 
must remain, but only in order to supervise the cease-fire line under UN observers.  The 
proposal also advocates that, given India’s violation of human rights in Kashmir, the U.S. 
should use its effective veto to stop the inflow of IMF and World Bank consortium funds 
to India.16 
 
Asia Society Proposal for Shared Responsibility 
Asia society, an American think-tank based in New York, has floated the idea of 
India and Pakistan ‘sharing responsibility’ on the resolution of the Kashmir crisis. This 
framework suggests that India should give special status to Kashmir, as a step to build 
 
16Saeed Shafqat (ed.) Contemporary Issues in Pakistan Studies. (Lahore: Azad Enterprises, 1998), 
p. 193. 
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trust between the populations of ‘both parts of Kashmir’ (India and Pakistan), as well as 
to stop external support to the Kashmiri militants. The Line of Control would then be 
converted into an international boundary between India and Pakistan. Building upon this 
framework in a rather optimistic fashion, it has proposed a ‘South Asia House’—a 
scheme of comprehensive cooperation between the countries of the subcontinent, perhaps 
leading to a confederation that would include Kashmir. 
The society envisages a role for the international community.  In particular, the 
U.S. and Russia could individually or jointly make efforts to bring India and Pakistan 
closer in resolving the issue. Through seminars, conferences, and by tabling resolutions 
in the United Nations, the international community can sensitize populations the world 
over to the need to seek solutions of the problem in Kashmir.17  Although the Kashmir 
issue is bilateral, the international salience of the issue can no longer be ignored. 
 
Divided Kashmir Proposal by Mushtaq Ur Rehman 
A leading Pakistani-American scholar has proposed to resolve the Kashmir dispute 
by dividing the state of Jammu and Kashmir following the precedence of the 1960 Indus 
Waters Treaty, which was based on a clear principle of division. 
The Indus River originates in Tibet, crosses the Himalayas and cuts through 
Jammu and Kashmir in a northwest direction and flows through Ladakh. In this section, 
the proposed division of the Indus Basin runs diagonally from Chenab to Karakorum 
Pass. 
The Jhelum river originates near Vernag Spring, not far from Zojila Pass. Below 
Kishinganga Junction, it forms the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir and the 
districts of Hazara and Rawalpindi. The basin of the Jhelum would fall within the 
exclusive domain of Pakistan.  
The source of the Chenab is on the southern flank of the main Himalayan chain, 
about 150 miles south of Leh. In general, the river flows parallel to the Indus to the 
northwest, then turns southwest and passes through the extreme southern corner of 
Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Below Akhnur, the river splits into smaller channels 
that could form the dividing line. Bilateral negotiations could amicably divide the Chenab 
Basin and address the question of Muslim majority districts in the area. 
To resolve the continuing conflict, a revolutionary reformation of policies 
acceptable to all involved parties—India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people—must be 
developed. An alternative based on dividing the river system to mirror the water 
appropriation in the Indus Waters Treaty could be a real solution. Like the Indus Waters 
Treaty itself, a resolution for settling the political status of Jammu and Kashmir would 
likely find broad support in the international community. It would also mark a bold step 
toward normalised relations, and provide hope for a better future for the entire region.18 
 
Kashmir Study Group (KSG) Proposal for Kashmir Entity based on Kashmiriyat 
A leading Kashmiri-American businessman, Farooq Kathwari, set up a Kashmir 
Study Group comprising leading American scholars, policy experts, and a retired 
Ambassador to explore ideas for a solution to the Kashmir problem. The KSG then 
 
17Ibid. p. 192. 
18Mushtaqur Rahman, op. cit; p. 161. 
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visited India and Pakistan to engage in an extensive series of talks about the Kashmir 
dispute with leading individuals in several urban centres and with many sets of expertise, 
including backgrounds in government, politics, military, diplomacy, scholarship, 
journalism, business, and non-governmental organisations. After their visits to both India 
and Pakistan, KSG published its report in 1997. In September 1999 it published an 
expanded version of this report titled “Kashmir: A Way Forward.” These two reports 
argued that the best way to ensure progress towards the resolution of the Kashmir dispute 
was to reconstitute J & K on the basis of Kashmiriyat—the cultural traditions of Kashmir. 
The extent of the reconstituted19 Kashmir would reflect the wishes of the residents of the 
parts of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. “The portion of the State to be so 
reconstituted shall be determined through an internationally supervised ascertainment of 
the wishes of the Kashmiri people on either side of the Line of Control.” The 
implementation of KSG proposals would require the pursuit of following goals: 
 Free access of a reconstituted Kashmir to and from both India and Pakistan, 
consisting of:  
– Freedom of individual movement, and  
– Free transit of people, goods, and services across residual Pakistani and 
Indian boundaries within Kashmir (e.g., the “Line of Control”) subject to 
tripartite arrangements.  
 Demilitarisation of the area of the reconstituted Kashmir, except to the extent 
necessary for Pakistan and India to:  
– “maintain logistic support for forces outside the [reconstituted] State that 
could not otherwise be effectively supplied”, and  
– along either side of the LOC, “until such time as both India and Pakistan 
decided to alter it in their mutual interest”, but  
– “Neither India nor Pakistan could place troops on the other side of the Line 
of Control without the permission of the other state.”  
 Pakistan and India would share “responsibility for the defense (external 
security) of the Kashmiri entity.” 
 The reconstituted Kashmir “would itself maintain police and gendarme forces 
for internal law and order (internal security) purposes.”20 
 
Sovereignty Association Proposal by Ayesha Jalal 
Ayesha Jalal21 has suggested a sovereignty association within a political 
framework for a reunified and independent Kashmir.  This option aims to address the fear 
and interest of both India and Pakistan as rival powers. For such an association to 
succeed, India and Pakistan would have to agree to extend the right of self-determination 
to all Kashmiris—Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist. Plebiscites or referenda would be held 
 
19The proposed reconstituted entity of Kashmir, in its essential features, would resemble the 
autonomous region of Andorra— the principality between France and Spain. The dispute between France and 
Spain over Andorra started in 803 AD and the solution was arrived in 1993. 
20Kashmir: A Way Forward, September 1999. (Washington: Kashmir Study Group, 1999). 
21 Ayesha Jalal as quoted in Mushtaqur Rahman, op. cit. p. 165. 
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throughout Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, to determine whether the people in 
that particular area wish to remain with India; choose independence; or seek a possible 
union with Azad Kashmir, which would not be included in the first round of voting. Jalal 
proposes that Indian and Pakistani troops be withdrawn, transforming Kashmir into a 
demilitarised zone with both countries guaranteeing its territorial integrity. The terms of a 
sovereignty association might allow India to maintain a limited military presence in 
Ladakh, and Pakistan at the Afghan border, in order to meet the strategic concerns of 
each country about potential threats emanating from outside the South Asian region. 
 
Independent States Proposal by Raju Thomas 
Raju Thomas has proposed the creation of several independent states in South Asia 
delineated along ethnic and religious demarcations. As in Western Europe, countries of 
South Asia could share natural resources, defense, and economies, governed by treaties. 
Within a zone of autonomous states, including several states in Kashmir, the central 
government of India or Pakistan would deal only with defense, foreign affairs, 
communications, and currency.22 
 
Partition Combined with Limited Plebiscite and UN Trusteeship Proposal by 
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema 
A leading Pakistani scholar, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema,23 has proposed that the most 
feasible solution of the problem seems to be a combination of partition, limited plebiscite 
and UN trusteeship. Given the region’s demographics, Azad Kashmir and Baltistan 
should stay with Pakistan, while Jammu and Ladakh should go to India. The Kashmir 
valley should be put under UN trusteeship for at least a decade to prepare the Valley for 
eventual plebiscite. Cheema argues that the UN Trusteeship Council should decide when 
the plebiscite would be held. However, there should a mandated time lag of at least one 
decade from the time the Valley is handed over the UN. 
 
The Lahore Declaration 
In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Muhammad 
Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 
20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service. 
The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional 
cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern.  The two Prime 
Ministers ultimately signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of 
peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their 
peoples. The Lahore Declaration provided the following: 
 “Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress 
and prosperity for their peoples; 
Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and 
friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the people of the two countries, 
enabling them to devote their energies for a better future; 
 
22 Raju Thomas as quoted in Mushtaqur Rahman, op. cit. pp. 165–66. 
23 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, op. cit. p. 12.  
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Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two 
countries add to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries; 
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence; 
Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the proliferation; 
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for 
improving the security environment; 
Recalling their agreement of 23 September 1998, that an environment of peace and 
security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all 
outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose; 
Have agreed that their respective Governments: 
 (1) Shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu 
and Kashmir.  
 (2) Shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.  
 (3) Shall intensify their compositor and integrated dialogue process for an early 
and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda. 
 (4) Shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised 
use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to 
elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional 
fields, aimed at prevention of conflict. 
 
The Andorra Model 
The Andorra proposal involves creating an autonomous region like the principality 
of Andorra between France and Spain with India and Pakistan jointly guaranteeing 
autonomy.  The dispute between France and Spain over the region started in 803 AD and 
the solution was arrived in 1993. The Andorra proposal relies on India and Pakistan 
overseeing the defence of the Kashmiri entity and jointly working out its funding.  
 
The Aaland Islands Model  
With a population of 26,000 and the total land area of 1,552 Square kilometers the 
Aaland Islands took on an international dimension when, on a British initiative, the issue 
of their autonomy was brought before the League of Nations in Geneva in 1921. The 
Islands, together with Finland, belonged to Sweden until 1809, at which time Sweden, 
after losing a war with Russia, was forced to relinquish Finland, together with Aaland, to 
the victor. 
Following the disintegration of the Czarist Empire in 1917, the Alanders launched 
a struggle for reunion with Sweden but the newborn state of Finland refused to give up 
part of its territory. In 1921, the League decided that the Åland Islands should belong to 
Finland but have autonomy that would guarantee their Swedish language and heritage. 
Ten states guaranteed the demilitarisation and neutralisation of the islands. 
With their autonomy backed by international guarantees, they have been used a 
model for resolving minority conflicts throughout the world. The Åland Islands have 
legislative powers in such areas as social and health care, the environment, trade and 
industry, culture and education, transport, postal services, policing, radio and TV 
broadcasting and local government, but relatively little authority to levy taxes The 
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autonomy of the Åland Islands is enshrined in the Finnish Constitution (Article 120) in 
accordance with the Åland Autonomy Act, which has been passed by the Finnish 
parliament and may only be amended or revised by a joint decision of the Finnish 
parliament and the parliament of the Åland Islands. This means that each of the two 
parties can veto any changes it does not accept. The concept of the Åland Islands’ 
autonomy is not based on the decentralisation of power but on an agreement of shared 
powers established with the help and under the auspices of an international institution, i.e. 
the League of Nations. 
 
The Irish Model 
The Irish peace process based on the April 1998 Good Friday Agreement signed 
between the United Kingdom of Britain and the Republic of Ireland and eight political 
parties of Northern Ireland have been posited as a relevant model for resolving the 
Kashmir dispute.24 The fundamental problem in Northern Ireland has been the violent 
thwarting of the desire of the Catholic nationalist minority living in six of its counties to 
seek union with the Republic of Ireland. The Protestant majority wants these areas to 
continue as part of the UK. The Good Friday Agreement brokered with the assistance of 
former US Senator Robert Mitchell offers the first tentative step on a long road to a 
complete and durable peace among the contending parties.25 It has been suggested that 
the Irish model provides peer learning in at least two ways. One, it offers an analogy of 
structured and sustained course of dialogue/negotiation process supported by well-
defined mechanisms—three strands—functioning quite satisfactorily. And, two, the 
resolution of the conflict is based on certain principles that may have some usefulness in 
determining the final settlement of the Kashmir conflict.26 The similarities suggested 
between the Irish model and the Kashmir conflict include the following: The similarities 
include in governability of the territory; alienation of the population; rigged polls; 
question of sovereignty; discriminatory practices followed by the state; and use of 
oppressive laws allowing use of force with impunity.27 
 
The Chenab Formula 
This plan envisages the division of Kashmir along the line of the River 
Chenab. According to the ‘Chenab Formula’, Pakistan may consider ‘Doaba’, a 
 
24For an excellent comprehensive discussion of the potential applicability of the Irish model to the 
Kashmir conflict see Shaheen Akhter, “Irish Model and Kashmir Conflict: Search for a New Paradigm for 
Peace in South Asia,” Regional Studies. Quarterly (Summer 2004). 
25The area of Northern Ireland is just over 14,000 square km, with a population of over 1.6 million and 
is only 20 miles at the nearest point from Britain. Over 50 percent of the population is comprised of Protestants 
who wish to remain part of the United Kingdom and just under 50 percent are Roman Catholics(23) who wish 
to join the predominantly Catholic 3.5 million in the Republic of Ireland 
The Island of Ireland is divided into the independent Republic of Ireland and the province of Northern 
Ireland, or Ulster, which is part of the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland had originally nine counties of which 
six comprise the present day-Northern Ireland. The other three, predominantly Catholic, became part of Ireland 
on its partition in 1920. The southern region subsequently cut all ties with Britain, becoming the independent 
Republic of Ireland in 1949. However, the six counties of Northern Ireland remained a part of the United 
Kingdom. Ulster’s partition from the remaining 26 counties of Ireland in 1921 has caused conflict throughout 
the history of the region. See Shaheen Akhter, Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid. 
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narrow strip of land between Chenab and Ravi in the suburbs of Shakargarh, 
stretching up to Chhamb, Dhodha and Rajwari districts as international border. Even 
the town of Kargil might go to India under this ‘give and take’ but from Kargil 
upward, India will have to agree to give territory to Pakistan,” the sources claimed.28 
Most of the districts in Jammu and on the left bank of the Chenab are Hindu majority 
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir while in most of the districts on the western side 
of the Chenab, the Muslim are predominant. The ‘Chenab formula’ was for the first 
time discussed between India and Pakistan in 1962-63, but the negotiations could not 
make any headway. According to former foreign secretary Niaz A. Naik, the proposal 
had been discussed during the unofficial efforts to normalise relations between 
Islamabad and New Delhi, known as track-II diplomacy, and Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Behari Vajpayee “had also evinced interest in it”. The Chenab formula attracted 
lot of attention in May 2003 when AJK Prime Minister Sardar Skiandar Hayat called 
upon India and Pakistan to seriously consider the division of J&K with River Chenab 
marking the boundary. Arguing that ‘this is not a new theory, nor am I the first one to 
have floated it” he expressed the hope that “India and Pakistan will give a serious 
consideration to this proposal to end the sufferings of the Kashmiris in particular and 
of their own people in general and thus materialise the long cherished hope of 
durable peace in the region.”29  
 
President Musharraf’s Proposal for Demilitarisation of Seven Zones 
Addressing a group of newspaper editors at an Iftar dinner in Islamabad on 
October 25, 2004, President General Pervez Musharraf called for a national debate on 
new options for the Kashmir dispute. The necessity for this debate stemmed from the fact 
that demands for conversion of LoC into an international border and plebiscite were not 
acceptable to Pakistan and India respectively. To break the deadlock he suggested that 
identification of various zones of the disputed territory needs to be carried out followed 
by their demilitarisation and a determination of their status. He identified the following 
seven regions for this purpose. Two regions—Azad Kashmir and Northern areas—are 
under the control of Pakistan whereas five regions are under Indian control. The first part 
comprises Jammu, Sambha and Katwa where Hindus are in majority. The second part 
also comprises Jammu but the areas include Dodha, Phirkuch and Rajawri where Muslim 
population is in majority which includes Gujars, Sidhans and Rajas who are also 
associated with Azad Kashmir. The third part is the area of Kashmir Valley which also 
has Muslim majority. The fourth part is Kargil which has Shia and Balti population in 
majority and the fifth area is Ladakh and adjoining areas where Buddhists live.30 
President Musharraf further said that it was imperative that the linguistic, ethnic, 
religious, geographic, political and other aspects of these seven regions should be 
reviewed and a peaceful solution to the problem found. President Musharraf’s call for 
open discussion on Kashmir was termed by the Pakistani Opposition parties as a “roll-
back” and it was dismissed by India as unacceptable as it envisaged redrawing of the 
 
28“Pakistan toying with Chenab Formula,” The Tribune (June 23, 2001). 
29“Sikandar defends Chenab Formula,” Dawn May 23, 2003. 
30Javed Rana, “Let UN oversee seven part Kashmir,” The Nation (October 26, 2004) 
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territorial map in J & K.31  President Musharraf’s proposal for the creation of seven 
demilitarised zones in J & K was consistent with his earlier attempts to  help create the 
much needed negotiating space for India and Pakistan that would allow them to move 
beyond their stated positions on Kashmir. In this context it is worth recalling that in a 
remarkable reversal of Islamabad’s verbal strategy on Kashmir, President Pervez 
Musharraf publicly stated on December 17, 2003 that even though “we are for United 
Nations Security resolutions…now we have left that aside.” To mollify New Delhi’s 
concerns relating to the issue of alleged “cross-border” infiltration from Pakistan, 
President Musharraf categorically pledged in an joint statement issued in Islamabad 
following his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee on January 
6, 2004 that “he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to 
support terrorism in any manner.”32 By dropping its longstanding demand for a UN-
mandated plebiscite over divided Kashmir and by assuring New Delhi that Islamabad 
would not encourage violent activity in the Indian-held Kashmir, President Musharraf 
went a long way to help create much needed political space for New Delhi to have a 
substantive engagement with Islamabad on the Kashmir dispute. 
As indicated by the above account of the various proposals and attempts aimed at 
resolving the Kashmir dispute, there is no dearth of ideas on how to resolve the Kashmir 
dispute. Based either on analogical reasoning or historical experience of conflict-
resolution attempts  involving other situations, most of  these proposals emphasise the 
need for transforming the dynamics of India-Pakistan conflict from a zero-sum 
competition over Kashmir to a positive sum situation in which both sides would gain 
from a settlement of the dispute. It is in this context of the challenge of reframing of 
Indian and Pakistan positions on the Kashmir dispute that Rawl’s advocacy of the 
Difference principle as a way of dealing with issues arising out of distributive justice in 
asymmetric conflicts like Kashmir becomes centrally relevant. The next section looks at 
some of the ways in which pursuit of Difference principle as a guide by India and 
Pakistan can help them evolve an approach to the Kashmir dispute in which benefits of 
peace-dividend will not only accrue to them but more importantly to the Kashmiris as 
well.  
 
SECTION III 
 
A.  Rawl’s Theory 
Justice, according to John Rawls, “is the first virtue of social institutions.”33 Its 
“primary subject” is “the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the 
major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the 
 
31Making a suo motu statement in Indian Parliament on foreign policy related issues, Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh said during his meeting with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in New York in 
September, 2004 they had agreed that “possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the J and K 
issue should be explored in a sincere spirit and a purposeful manner.  
“I made it clear to President Musharraf that while we are willing to look at various options, we would 
not agree to any redrawing of boundaries, or another partition of the country,” Singh said. “No Redrawing of 
Border: PM,” Press Trust of India December 21, 2004. 
32For the text of the January 6 Joint Statement see http://in.news.yahoo.com/040106/137/2ar3r.html 
33John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 3. 
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division of advantages from social cooperation.”34 The central problem for a theory of 
justice is to identify the principles by which the basic structure of society can be 
appraised.35  
Rawls attempts to resolve the problem of inequality by conceiving of the 
principles of justice as being drawn up by individuals in an “original position” of perfect 
equality, where a “veil of ignorance” operates to prevent them from maximising their 
own future positions by manipulating the terms of the social contract to their own 
advantage. What principles of social organisation would individuals choose in the 
original position? Rawls hypothesises two fundamental principles of justice that would 
get incorporated in the social contract. These are the general principles of maximum 
liberty and equal opportunity: 
(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
(2) Social and income equalities are to be arranged so that they are both:  
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle, and 
(b) attached to the offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity (p. 302). 
Rawls regards the first rule of maximum liberty as lexically superior to the second, 
and within the second rule, he holds 2b, the fair opportunity principle, to be lexically 
superior to 2a, the difference principle. Rawls argues that the adoption of these rules by 
individuals in the original position is the logical consequence of their deliberations aimed 
at the formation of a single society dedicated to the common good.   
These principles form the bedrock of Rawls’s “general conception” of justice 
defined as a situation in which “all social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the lease 
favoured.”36  Rawls regards society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”37 
Society is “typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests.” There is 
an identity of interests since everyone shares an interest in having access to the various 
goods that social activity can provide. At the same time, people’s claims to these scarce 
goods may conflict. Principles are thus needed to for choosing among the various social 
arrangements which will fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of social life.38 Rawls 
argues that based on the choices of individuals in the original position, the two principles 
of Equal liberty and the Difference principle will not only provide the “lexical ordering” 
of the principles of justice but also offer the most fundamental moral standards for their 
social institutions. Equal liberty will normally be inviolable and the Difference Principle 
 
34Ibid, p.  7. 
35As he points out the principles of social justice “regulate the choice of a political constitution and the 
main elements of the economic and social system. The justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how 
fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social conditions in the 
various sectors of the society.” Ibid.  
36Ibid.  pp. 302-3. 
37Ibid. p. 4. 
38Ibid, p. 5. 
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cannot be sacrificed for the sake of greater efficiency.39 According to Rawls, these 
principles of justice have several attractions. First, the Difference principle provides a 
determinate solution to the distributional problem—the bete noire of liberal welfare 
economics.40 Second, since everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation 
without which no one could have a satisfactory life, adherence to a social arrangement 
capable of generating allegiance from all persons will be in everyone’s interest. Third, 
adherence to these principles of justice will minimise the “strain of commitment” in 
comparison with other sorts of moral principles. That is, while moral choices may always 
require a degree of personal fortitude on the part of the individuals those who adhere to 
these principles within the framework of just institutions, will have relatively less 
difficulty in putting their beliefs into action.  
What is the relevance of these Rawlsian principles for resolving the Kashmir 
dispute? There are several features of the Kashmir dispute which make it a promising 
case for the application of Rawls’s theory. The first is the centrality of the issue of justice 
underpinning the dispute. As noted by Sumantra Bose:  
“The popular uprising for self-determination in Indian-administered Jammu and 
Kashmir has been caused by…the denial of democracy by the Indian state to its 
Kashmir citizens in the post-colonial period. Kashmiris rose in rebellion not 
because Muslims are constitutionally incapable of loyalty to a secular state, but 
because they saw no hope of redressal within the Indian state’s institutional 
framework to the gross, consistent and systematic pattern of abuse of their rights 
as citizens and as human beings…For Kashmiris, Indian democracy and its 
institution is truly the God that failed and failed disastrously…the reason why they 
(Kashmiri Muslims) seem so insistent on freedom—which means, above all, 
freedom from Indian rule—is the conviction born of their experiences that their 
collective will for democratic, responsible and accountable government is 
incompatible with their presently coerced—as opposed to voluntary and freely 
consenting—status as integral part of  India”.41 
The eruption of the armed uprising in the Kashmir Valley in 1989 marked the 
culmination of Kashmiri protest against years of injustice, repression and denial of their 
democratic rights by New Delhi. Any workable solution to the Kashmir dispute, thus, 
must address itself to the deep sense of injury felt by Kashmiris’ due to prolonged Indian 
state-oppression. All previous attempts to resolve the dispute have miserably failed 
principally because they either excluded the Kashmiris as key stake holders in a 
settlement (1972 Simla Agreement being the prime example) or visualised settlements 
that were perceived as unjust by them. This is as much true of the UN Resolutions on 
 
39Ibid, pp. 302-3.  
40As he states: “This principle removes the indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency by singling 
out a particular position from which the social and economic inequalities of the structure are to be judged. 
Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the higher 
expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they works as part of a scheme which improves the 
expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to 
establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those 
less fortunate.” Ibid, p. 75. 
41Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-determination and a Just Peace. (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 115 and 9. 
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Kashmir as it is true of the many other proposals that have been put forth to resolve the 
dispute. While acknowledging their right to self-determination, the UN Resolutions 
unduly limited this right to a choice between India and Pakistan. The absence of the third 
option of Kashmir becoming a sovereign entity has had the unfortunate consequence of 
enabling both India and Pakistan to present the Kashmir question as an “entitlement 
issue”42 before the world. India-Pakistan quarrel over Kashmir as an entitlement issue has 
distorted its essential character as a normative issue involving the ideal of self-
determination.  
Second, given the fact that Kashmiris’ are the most disadvantaged party to the 
dispute, their individual and collective rights in a future India-Pakistan peace deal can 
only be safeguarded if they are approached from the difference principle of Rawlsian 
theory. The difference principle requires that the least advantaged gain at least something 
as the more advantaged gain. In order for this to happen, the most advantaged obviously 
cannot be taking from the least advantaged for then the latter would lose not gain. This 
means that for all parties to the dispute to gain, they must seek a solution in which there 
is high regard for the interests of both Self and Other. The collective rational choice for 
all parties to the conflict—India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris—is to reach the win-win 
outcome through mutual cooperation. Here it may be argued that since Kashmir dispute is 
inherently an asymmetric43 triangular conflict in which there is imbalance of power 
between India, the top dog, Pakistan, the middle dog, and Kashmiris, the underdog, no 
“win-win” outcomes are possible as resolving the conflict is not in the interest of  the top 
dog power. Such reasoning ignores the fact that, while harder to resolve, asymmetric 
conflicts do impose significant costs on all parties. As pointed out by Hugh Miall:  
“It is oppressive to be an oppressor, even if not so oppressive as to be oppressed. 
There are costs for the top dogs in sustaining themselves in power and keeping the 
underdogs down. In severe asymmetric conflicts the cost of the relationship becomes 
unbearable for both sides. This then opens the possibility for conflict resolution 
through a shift from the existing structure of relationships to one another.”44 
Commenting on the costs of Kashmir conflict to India, The Economist wrote:   
Kashmir has less self-government than any other Indian state. But depriving Kashmiris 
of political power has not obviously benefited the rest of the country: it has tied down 
hundreds of thousands of soldiers in an expensive occupation, turned many Kashmiris into 
potential traitors and damaged India’s reputation for political decency. If India is to regain 
Kashmiris’ loyalty and the rest of the world’s respect, it needs to give the state the autonomy 
that Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s greatest Kashmiri, long time ago promised.”45 
 
42For an excellent discussion of Indian and Pakistan claims to Kashmir as an entitlement issue, that is, 
over original right to territory see Robert Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional 
Conflict and Its Resolution. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), ch. 1.  
43In asymmetric conflicts, the root of the conflict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide 
the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. In such conflicts the 
structure is such that the top dog always wins, the underdog always loses. The only way to resolve the conflict 
is to change the structure of unbalanced relationships into peaceful and dynamic one. 
44Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The 
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. (London: Polity Press, 2000), p. 12. 
45“The Kashmiris’ case,” The Economist. May 20, 1995. 
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These internal costs relating to governance problems for India pale into 
insignificance when one contemplates the devastation that would ensue from an India-
Pakistan conflict over Kashmir turning nuclear. According to one estimate a limited 
counter-value nuclear exchange between the two countries could result in twelve million 
deaths.46 The advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia not only has given both India and 
Pakistan a shared stake in war-avoidance over Kashmir but has also imposed a common 
obligation on them to avoid violent conflict behaviour marked by threats, coercion and 
destructive attacks against each other.47  
The third factor that makes Rawlsian principles so promising for the Kashmir 
dispute is the stability value of the difference principle. “A system”, according to Rawls, 
“is in equilibrium…when it has reached a state that persists indefinitely over time.” A 
stable equilibrium exists when the system returns to its original state after external forces 
have impinged upon it, and it is unstable if these forces succeed in changing it 
permanently. Given Rawls’s analysis of the least or most disadvantaged, one can ask how 
stable or unstable the equilibrium of a Kashmir settlement would be with regard to the 
distribution of advantages or disadvantages amongst all the parties. If pursued in earnest, 
the difference principle (providing that the least advantaged gain as a result of gain to the 
most advantaged) would serve as a stabilising force since all cases of gains for the most 
advantaged will concomitantly yield benefits for the least advantaged as well. If a 
settlement based on the difference principle can be stable in terms of gains for every 
body, then the obverse condition of a decline, wherein any loss to the least advantaged is 
matched by some loss to the most advantaged, should also have some stability value. This 
has been termed as “negative difference principle” by Midlarsky to reflect the negative 
sum of both losses in contrast to the positive sum of the Rawlsian statement.”48  The 
operation of the “negative difference principle” would cushion an agreed settlement 
against risks of failure as losses would accrue not only to the least advantaged but also to 
the most advantaged as well. The setting up of a formal mechanism for the 
institutionalisation of common losses would be a vital component for underwriting the 
stability of the settlement.  
And finally, underlying principles of Rawlsian theory of justice have acquired a 
special significance for Kashmir dispute as issues of entitlement to and distribution of 
water resources between India, Pakistan and the state of Jammu and Kashmir become 
“securitised”. Due to increase in water stress in India and Pakistan, the 1960 Indus Water 
 
46The Natural Resource Defense Council estimate cited in Dr. Zulifqar Khan, “India Pakistan Nuclear 
Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions and Mutual Deterrence,”  IPRI Paper No. 9 (Islamabad: IPRI, 2005), p. 36 
47The January 6, 2004 joint statement signed by Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and the 
Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee during the SARRC Summit in Islamabad noted that “….in order 
to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented.” It further 
said that “President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee the he will not permit any territory under 
Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.” For complete text see The News (Islamabad) 
January 7, 2004. 
48Manus I. Midlarsky, “Balance of Power as a “Just” Historical System,” Polity. Vol. xvi, No. 2 
(Winter 1983), p. 185. Viewing the negative difference principle as a condition for stability in domestic life, 
Midlarsky states: “Both sectors move in the same direction and a common fate or destiny is perceived 
throughout society. A strong destabilising condition develops, on the other hand, where the sectors move 
dissynchronously, where the most advantaged gain either at the expense of the least advantaged, or push 
forward without any gain at all to the least advantaged.” Ibid.  
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Treaty has come under strain. The looming crisis of water scarcity in the subcontinent 
necessitates finding viable resource distribution principles. Here consideration of their 
water needs on the basis of the difference principle could be of immense help. 
Commenting on the need for standards of equity required in such matters of natural 
resource distribution as water, Charles R. Beitz says:  
 “…the resource distribution principle would function in international society as 
the difference principle functions in domestic society. It provides assurance to 
persons in resource-poor societies that their adverse fate will not prevent them 
from realising economic conditions sufficient to support just social institutions and 
to protect human rights guaranteed by the principles for individuals. In the absence 
of this assurance, these nations might resort to war as a means of securing the 
resources necessary to establish domestic justice, and it is not obvious that wars 
fought for this purpose would be unjust.”49 
If nuclear-armed India and Pakistan have to avert the horrifying prospect of future 
water wars between them, then it is imperative that they find a fair formula that allows 
them to secure fair conditions for the development of their respective national schemes to 
deal with the critical problem of water scarcity. Rawlsian theory of justice which regards 
society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” based on the difference principle 
offers them a way out of this bleak scenario.  
 
 
49Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), pp. 141-142. 
Summary of the Proposed Solutions for Kashmir Dispute (1947–2005) 
     Responses Comments 
Period Source Nature of Solution Basic Principles Status India Pakistan Kashmiris Pros Cons 
1947-57 Sir Owen Dix-
on’s proposal 
Hold Plebiscite in 
Jammu and Kash-
mir 
Kashmir belongs 
neither to India nor 
to Pakistan, rather it 
belong to Kashmir-
is. 
Awaiting imple-
mentation 
(World wary of 
self-
determination) 
India accepted, 
but later reneged. 
Favoured option, 
officially com-
mitted to pursu-
ing it. 
Supported by 
majority of 
Kashmiris, now 
including APHC 
- Values self-
determination 
- Puts Kashmiris at the 
centre 
- Enjoys UN legitimacy
- Practicable esp. in its 
regional form. 
- Goes beyond status 
quo 
- Rejected in the past. 
- Does not allow third 
option 
- Ignores the ethnic, 
linguistic and reli-
gious complexity of 
the J &K 
1958-1968 India-Pakistan 
Statement of 
Objectives (1963) 
Political, peaceful 
settlement 
Equitable, honoura-
ble and final 
boundary settlement
Abandoned Agreed Agreed Excluded - Consensus statement 
- Addresses Indian and 
Pakistani concerns 
- Does not address 
present-day realities 
- Excludes Kashmiris 
- Suffers from the 
stigma of secrecy 
 Tashkent Decla-
ration (1966) 
Status Quo Status Quo Overtaken by 
events 
Agreed Agreed Excluded - Brokered by third 
party. 
- Addresses Indian and 
Pakistani concerns 
- Devoid of practical 
steps. 
- Out of step with 
current realities 
 Sumit Ganguly’s 
proposal, first 
offered by Indian 
Prime Minister 
Lal Bahadur 
Shastri After 
Tashkent Decla-
ration 
Status Quo Convert line of 
control into recog-
nised international 
boundary between 
India and Pakistan. 
Possible solution; 
under considera-
tion 
Favoured Rejected Rejected - Enjoys global support.
- Accepts ground 
reality as truth 
- Avoids disruptive 
change 
- Violates self-
determination 
- Divides Kashmiris 
- Not acceptable to 
Pakistan 
- Has not worked in the 
past. 
- Equates reality with 
truth 
 
 
 Selig Harrison’s 
Proposal dis-
cussed between 
President Ayub 
and Prime 
Minister Nehru in 
1964. 
A Trieste Solution In Italy and the 
Former Yugoslavia, 
residents of Trieste 
were given free 
access to the other 
side.  The same 
solution was 
suggested for 
Kashmir, while 
giving a special 
autonomous status 
to the region.  
Defence, foreign 
affairs, communica-
tion and currency 
would be controlled 
by both India and 
Pakistan, leaving 
Kashmir independ-
ent in all other 
matters. 
Possible solution; 
under considera-
tion 
Fall-back option Opposes Opposes - Enjoys international 
support. 
- Seeks to transform the 
dynamics of Kashmir 
conflict 
- Offers incremental 
rather than abrupt 
change. 
- Has a people-centric 
perspective  
- Ignores the end goals 
of the Kashmiri free-
dom movement. 
- Suffers from a flawed 
analogy. 
- Puts too much confi-
dence in CBMs to 
deliver peace 
1969-1979 Simla Agreement Status-quo pending 
final solution 
Bilateral approach, 
including mutually 
acceptable forms of 
mediation. 
Possible solution; 
under considera-
tion 
Favoured, with 
narrow 
 nterprettation 
Favoured, with 
broad interpreta-
tion 
Indifferent - Provides a framework 
for achieving pro-
gress. 
- Forbids use of force. 
- Has int. support 
- Contested Indian and 
Pakistani interpreta-
tions. 
- Excludes Kashmiris. 
- Treats J & K as a 
bilateral issue 
1980-1990 Robert Wirsing’s 
proposal 
International 
mediation 
Apply international 
pressure more 
deliberately, 
consistently, and 
impartially in order 
to resolve the 
dispute. 
Possible solution 
until recently 
Strongly op-
posed 
Favoured Divided; some 
segments 
support, while 
others oppose 
- Seeks global involve-
ment. 
- Has advantages of 
third party mediation. 
- Focuses attention on 
Kashmir as a trouble 
spot 
- Assumes third parties 
are neutral players. 
- Opposed by India. 
- Takes the initiative 
away from Kashmiri’s.
- Gets Kashmir tangled 
in global power dy-
namics 
Continued— 
Summary of the Proposed Solutions for Kashmir Dispute 
     Responses Comments 
Period Source Nature of Solution Basic Principles Status India Pakistan Kashmiris Pros Cons 
1991-2001 Proposal of BJP 
& other Hindu 
Nationalist 
movements 
Demographic 
change in Kashmir 
Opening Kashmir to 
Hindu and Sikh 
settlement to 
transform Kashmir 
into a Hindu-Sikh 
majority state. 
Internationally 
rejected 
Divided; some 
segments 
support, while 
others oppose 
Strongly opposed Strongly op-
posed 
-Favours settlement of J 
&K on Indian terms. 
-Transforms current 
dynamics of Kashmir 
conflict by creating new 
facts on ground 
-Totally unacceptable to 
Pakistan and majority of 
Kashmiris. 
-Puts Pakistan at an 
extreme disadvantage. 
-Legitimises Indian 
hegemony over Kashmir
 Jammu & 
Kashmir Libera-
tion Front (JKLF) 
Independent 
Kashmir 
Recognition of fully 
independent and 
democratic state of 
Jammu and Kashmir
Remains a 
possibility 
Strongly 
opposed 
Strongly opposed Divided; some 
segments 
support, while 
others oppose 
-Puts Kashmiris at the 
centre stage. 
-Broadens the scope of 
existing binary options. 
-Unhinges Kashmir 
from India-Pakistan 
stranglehold. 
-Opposed by both India 
and Pakistan. 
-Marred by partisan 
advocacy. 
-Contested option. 
 The Kashmir 
American 
Council 
Active US media-
tion 
Initiate step by step 
peace process 
through US-
supervised negotia-
tions 
Possible solu-
tion; under 
consideration 
Strongly 
opposed 
Strongly favoured Favoured, with 
reservations 
-Incremental approach. 
-U.S-brokered deal. 
-Advantages of third 
party involvement 
-Opposed by India. 
-US not a neutral party. 
-After 9/11 US credibil-
ity as honest-broker 
severely undermined 
 
     Responses Comments 
Period Source Nature of Solution Basic Principles Status India Pakistan Kashmiris Pros Cons 
 Raju Thomas’s 
proposal 
Create several 
Independent states 
Create several 
independent states in 
South Asia, along 
ethnic and religious 
lines  
Not valid; 
threatens to 
further enhance 
ethnic violence 
Strongly 
opposed 
Strongly opposed Favoured, with 
reservations 
-Treats South Asia as a 
potential security 
community 
-Cognizant of the 
linguistic, cultural, 
ethnic and religious 
diversity of the region 
and that of J & K 
-Too idealistic 
-Understates the force of 
integral nationalism in 
the region. 
-Will encounter opposi-
tion from India and 
Pakistan. 
-No clear road map for 
achieving stated goals. 
 Pervaiz Iqbal 
Cheema’s 
proposal 
Combination of 
partition, limited 
plebiscite and UN-
trusteeship 
Azad Kashmir and 
Baltistan stay with 
Pakistan; Jammu 
and Ladakh with 
India and Kashmir 
valley should be put 
under UN trustee-
ship for a decade or 
more until a final 
plebiscite. 
Possible solu-
tion; under 
consideration 
Opposed Opposed Mostly opposed -Takes a practical view 
of the situation. 
-Seeks tripartite divi-
sion of J &K along 
religious, cultural and 
ethnic lines. 
-Opposed by India. 
-Not favoured by most 
Kashmiris. 
-Variation on Dixon 
proposal – faces the 
same problems. 
 Kashmir Study 
Group 
Shared sovereignty Trilateral Discus-
sions 
Widely discusses Opposed Flexible Favoured with 
reservations 
-Taken seriously by 
India, Pakistan and the 
Kashmiris. 
-Takes into account the 
ground realities of the 
Kashmir situation and 
also the national interest 
of India and Pakistan. 
-Pedaled by a Kashmiri-
American. 
-Promotes Kashmiriyat 
-Opposed by extremist 
Hindu parties in India. 
-Tainted by its Ameri-
can origins. 
-Falls short of full 
sovereignty for the 
Kashmiris. 
-Is opposed by vocal 
sections in India and 
Pakistan 
 
     Responses Comments 
Period Source Nature of Solution Basic Principles Status India Pakistan Kashmiris Pros Cons 
 Ayesha Jalal Create a Sover-
eignty Association 
A sovereignty 
association within a 
political framework 
for a unified and 
independent Kashmir 
would accommodate 
the fears and inter-
ests of the two main 
regional powers. 
Unlikely Opposed Unconvinced Unconvinced, 
though some 
segments 
demand unifica-
tion and inde-
pendence 
-Seeks to change the 
status quo by changing 
thought patterns. 
-Too idealistic 
-ignores ground reali-
ties. 
-Ignores the force of 
Pakistani, Indian and 
Kashmiri nationalisms. 
 Mushtaq ur 
Rahman 
Divided Kashmir Indus Water Treaty 
as a model 
Hotly discussed Acceptable as a 
fall-back 
position 
Acceptable as a 
fall-back position
Unacceptable -Builds on past experi-
ence. 
-Guards economic 
interests of India and 
Pakistan. 
-Has greater chance of 
acceptance for its 
logical appeal 
-Legitimises the status 
quo. 
-Ignores self-
determination and issues 
of justice. 
-Treats J &K as a real 
estate issue and ignores 
its human and cultural 
dimensions 
 Lahore Declara-
tion (1999) 
Negotiated settle-
ment 
Bilateral discussion Hotly discussed Acceptable as a 
viable solution 
Agreeable, with 
reservations 
Excluded -Builds on past experi-
ence. 
-Calls for a negotiated 
settlement through 
dialogue 
-Opposed by right wing 
parties in Pakistan. 
-No clear road map 
 The Andorra 
Model 
 
 
India-Pakistan 
Condominium 
Bilateral discussion In circulation 
among American 
circles 
Might be 
acceptable as an 
alternative to 
Independent 
Kashmir 
Agreeable as fall 
back position 
Excluded -India-Pakistan joint 
control. 
-Satisfying for both. 
 
-Variant on maximum 
autonomy and likely to 
be opposed by leading 
Kashmiri groups. 
-Flawed analogy 
between Andorra and J 
&K 
 
 
     Responses Comments 
Period Source Nature of Solution Basic Principles Status India Pakistan Kashmiris Pros Cons 
2001-2005 The Chenab 
Formula 
Division of J &K Bilateral discussions Discussed during 
Track II (Niaz A 
Naik- R.K 
Mishra Talks 
Might be 
acceptable to 
Pakistan 
Opposed by India Excluded -Addresses the water 
issues. 
-Rationalised division of 
Kashmir on religious 
basis 
-Opposed by India. 
-Legitimises status 
quo. 
-Narrow focus 
-Ignores larger dimen-
sions of the problem 
 The Musharraf 
Proposal 
Division and 
demilitarisation on 
geographical basis 
Bilateral discussions Hotly debated in 
Pakistan 
Acceptable to 
Pakistan 
Rejected by India Mixed reaction 
from Kashmiri 
groups 
-Unfreezes the status 
quo. 
-Marks a shift in Paki-
stani thinking on the 
Kashmir issue. 
-Departure from stated 
positions 
-Opposed by India. 
Opposed by religious 
parties in Pakistan. 
-No clear road map. 
-Variation on Dixon 
proposal 
 The Aaland 
Islands Model 
Demilitarisation, 
limited autonomy  
International in-
volvement and 
guarantees 
Seldom dis-
cussed  
Not acceptable 
to Pakistan 
Offered to 
Kashmiris as part 
of autonomy 
formulas 
Mixed reaction 
from Kashmiri 
groups. Majority 
not in favour. 
-Stabilises the status 
quo; 
-Seeks international 
involvement; 
 
-Opposed by Pakistan; 
-Flawed analogy with 
Kashmir due to 
differences in size, 
history, ethnicity and 
India-Pakistan stakes; 
Presumes global 
willingness to help. 
 The Good Friday 
Agreement (Irish 
Model) 
Sustained and 
structured dialogue 
process 
Popular consent and 
self-determination 
Hotly discussed  As a possible 
option 
Widely discussed Widely dis-
cussed without 
outright rejection
-Centrality of self-
determination; 
-Popular participation; 
-Third party mediation: 
-Ignores the fact that 
Kashmir is an interna-
tional conflict while 
Ireland is essentially an 
internal issue of unifica-
tion. 
-Conflicts with stated 
Indian position on 
Kashmir; 
-Presupposes institu-
tionalised and struc-
tured dialogue process 
between India, Paki-
stan and the Kash-
miri’s which is not 
there. 
- 
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